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BLIGHTING THE WAY: URBAN RENEWAL,
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, AND THE
ELUSIVE DEFINITION OF BLIGHT
Colin Gordon*
What is "blight"? Over half a century of federal and state urban
renewal policy, and a slightly shorter history of local economic de-
velopment policies, revolve around this question. These policies,
ranging from the first stabs at federally-funded Urban renewal in
the 1940s1 to the contemporary fascination of local and state gov-
ernments with tax increment financing ("TIF"),2 all involve, to
some degree, public financing of private economic development or
property transactions. In effect, such policies extend the public
credit and the public power of eminent domain to private inter-
ests-a combination that has often incurred the opposition of both
taxpayers and property owners displaced by urban renewal or re-
development.4 The legal and political justification for such poli-
cies, as a result, leans heavily on an overarching public purpose: the
elimination or prevention of blight.5 But "blight" is rarely defined
with any precision in such statutes, and the courts have granted
local interests almost carte blanche in their creative search for
* Assoc. Professor of History, Univ. of Iowa.
1. See Jonathan M. Purver, Annotation, What Constitutes "Blighted Area" Within
Urban Renewal and Redevelopment Statutes, 45 A.L.R.3d 1096, § 2(a) (1972) (noting
that "[t]he Housing Act of 1949 extended the scope of previous acts so as to permit a
state unit, with federal assistance, to go beyond the establishment of low-rent projects
and engage in broader urban development purposes").
2. Like most forms of property tax abatement, TIFs are enabled by state legisla-
tion and employed largely by local governments. A TIF freezes the assessed valua-
tion of a redevelopment parcel for a specified period (in some states as long as 23
years). See NEIGHBORHOOD CAPITAL BUDGET GROUP, WHO PAYS FOR THE ONLY
GAME IN TOWN? 3 (2002), [hereinafter NCBG, WHO PAYS] available at http://www.
ncbg.org/tifs/game.htm. Conventional property taxes are levied on this pre-develop-
ment valuation. Id. at 30. But taxes on the increase in property value (the "incre-
ment") accrue to a special fund, and are used to cover various costs of the
redevelopment-including infrastructure and land acquisition. See id. at 32.
3. See Julie A. Goshorn, In a TIF Why Missouri Needs a Tax Increment Financ-
ing Reform, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 919, 922-26 (1999).
4. See Catherine Michel, Brother, Can You Spare a Dime: Tax Increment Financ-
ing in Indiana, 71 IND. L.J. 457, 463 (1996) (noting that a municipality's eminent do-
main power is an important component of redevelopment).
5. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 919.
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"blighted" areas eligible for federal funds or local tax breaks.6 This
political and statutory confusion is rooted in a long history of local
anxiety surrounding inner city housing,7 "slum clearance,"8 and the
fate of the central business district.9 A blighted area, as a Philadel-
phia planner proposed cryptically in 1918, "is a district which is not
what it should be,"'10 and it is woven through recent history, eco-
nomic development and urban redevelopment policies." The goals
of such policies have always been to eradicate blight; however, as
one California state legislator lamented in 1995, "Somewhere along
the way ... defining blight became an art form.' 12
A few examples underscore the problem. In affluent Coronado,
California, local officials declared the entire town blighted in
1985.13 The resulting TIF zone diverted property tax revenues
from the local schools, making the district eligible for supplemental
school funding from the state. 4 The city then used the revenues
from the TIF to pay for school improvements. 15 In the St. Louis
6. See id. at 922-23 (noting that TIF statutes are "broadly-worded" and therefore
allow many projects to fall under the definition of blight).
7. See Purver, supra note 1, § 2(a) (noting that the President's Advisory Commit-
tee in 1953 stated that blighted areas create insolvency, crime, fire, disease and
delinquency).
8. See id.
9. See id. (noting that blighted areas are economic liabilities that impair the
growth of towns and cities).
10. ROBERT FOGELSON, DOWNTOWN: ITs RISE AND FALL, 1880-1950, at 348
(2001) (quoting William A. Stanton, Blighted Districts in Philadelphia, Proceeding of
the Tenth Nat'l Conference on City Planning 76 (1918)).
11. E.g., infra notes 13-19 and accompanying text (explaining how blight designa-
tions are used in an array of broadly defined circumstances, to effectively subsidize
suburban improvement projects in areas that may be under-performing economically,
but are not blighted in the original sense and are not designed to service low-income
interests).
12. Letter from Phillip Isenberg, Assemblyman, Ninth District, Cal. Legislature,
to Hon. Tom Campbell, Chair, Cal. S. Hous. & Land Use Comm., and Hon. Charles
Calderon, Chair, Cal. S. Select Comm. on Redevelopment (Dec. 13, 1995), reprinted
in Redevelopment and Blight: Joint Interim Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Hous. & Land Use & Senate Select Comm. on Redevelopment, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg.
Sess. 831-S (Cal. 1995) (available in appendix of Written Materials Submitted to the
Committees).
13. Peter Detwiler & John Dale, Redevelopment and Blight: A Background Staff
Paper for the Joint Interim Hearing, in Redevelopment and Blight: Joint Interim Hear-
ing Before the Senate Comm. on Hous. & Land Use & Senate Select Comm. on Rede-
velopment, 1995-1996 Leg., Reg. Sess. 831-S, at 11 (Cal. 1995) ("In November 1985,
the City of Coronado adopted a redevelopment plan for the entire city. All property,
except the land owned by the state and federal governments, was declared blighted
for purposes of redevelopment.").
14. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight That's Right for California Redevelop-
ment Law, 52 HASTINGS L.J. 991, 999 (2001).
15. See Detwiler & Dale, supra note 13, at 11-12.
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suburb of Des Peres, local officials declared a thriving shopping
mall "blighted" in 1997 because it "was too small and had too few
anchor stores," and more specifically, because it didn't have a
Nordstrom's. 16 The blight designation paved the way for a $ 30
million TIF deal that was used to attract the upscale retailer and
other new tenants.17 In Lancaster, California, local developers
used a blight designation and the accompanying tax subsidies to
develop a new mall in the mid-1980's around "anchor" stores in-
cluding Costco, Wal-Mart, and 99 Cents. 8 When Costco
threatened to relocate in 1998, Lancaster officials relying on the
old "blight" designation moved to acquire the 99 Cents property
through eminent domain-with the intention of giving it to Costco
outright, a tack which the courts, in a rare check on local blighting,
condemned as "nothing more than the desire to achieve the naked
transfer of property from one private party to another.., to satisfy
the private expansion demands of Costco."19
Clearly "blight" has lost any substantive meaning as either a
description of urban conditions or a target for public policy. Blight
is less an objective condition than it is a legal pretext for various
forms of commercial tax abatement that, in most settings, divert
money from schools and county-funded social services.2° Redevel-
opment policies originally intended to address unsafe or insuffi-
cient urban housing are now more routinely employed to subsidize
the building of suburban shopping malls. 21 And such policies (es-
pecially state TIF programs) not only ignore the ongoing urban cri-
16. See Josh Reinert, Tax Increment Financing in Missouri: Is it Time for Blight
and But-For to Go?, 45 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1019, 1019-21 (2001).
17. See JG St. Louis W. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 516-17 (Mo.
Ct. App. 2001); Reinert, supra note 16, at 1045-46; Dan Mihalopoulos, West County
Mall Wins Initial Backing; Panel Agrees Center is Blighted, Needs Subsidy, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 21, 1997, at C1 [hereinafter Mihalopoulos, West County Mall
Wins Initial Backing]; Dan Mihalopoulos, Developers Make Pitch for Tax Breaks in
West County Mall Project; 200 Turn Out to Hear Pros and Cons of Allowing $30 Mil-
lion in Subsidies, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Nov. 14, 1997, at C9.
18. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
19. Id. at 1129.
20. See Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 998-1002 (finding that states and counties are the
primary TIF losers).
21. E.g., supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text (providing examples of abuses
of the intended purposes of redevelopment policies).
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sis, but by subsidizing sprawl, routinely contribute to blight in the
cities under the pretext of fighting it in the suburbs.22
I. FIGHTING BLIGHT: THE LEGAL AND
LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
The modern statutory definition of blight is rooted in our first
urban crisis, the Progressive-era response to the urbanization and
industrialization in the late nineteenth and early twentieth cen-
tury.23 Lamentable urban conditions, captured in the investiga-
tions of Jacob Riis and others, 4 included the encroachment of
commercial or industrial properties on residential neighborhoods,
the inadequacy of basic public services, and the threat of moral
decay, fire, and disease posed by tenement housing of urban work-
ing families. Cities, in the environmental determinism of urban
reformers, had become "nurseries of crime, and of the vices and
disorderly courses which lead to crime... perpetrated by individu-
als who have either lost connection with home life, or never had
any, or whose homes had ceased to be sufficiently separate, decent,
and desirable to afford what are regarded as ordinary wholesome
influences of home and family." 26 Tenements, and substandard ur-
ban housing more :generally, were considered "standing menaces to
the family, to morality, to the public health, and to civic
integrity.'"27
The political response to such conditions ranged widely, and in-
cluded urban beautification campaigns, 8 the "model tenement"
movement,29"managerial" reform of urban governance, 30 early ef-
forts at urban planning and zoning,31 and prohibition.32 But, de-
22. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 921-22 (describing how TIF statutes have been
used to change thriving neighborhoods into busting commercial centers and create
projects adverse to TIF's true redevelopment purpose).
23. See Purver, supra note 1, § 1(a).
24. FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 320.
25. See JACOB Riis, How THE OTHER HALF LIVES 2-3 (Hill and Wang 1957)
(1890).
26. Id. at 1-2 (quoting 1863 testimony of a New York prison official).
27. FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 323 (quoting E.R.L. Gould, The Housing Prob-
lem, MUN. AFFAIRS, Mar. 1899, at 109).
28. See id. at 338.
29. See id. at 326-29.
30. See id. at 340 (discussing how the Housing Act of 1937 was needed to clear
slums and build new housing).
31. See id. at 160-66.
32. See id. at 355-56 (explaining that city planners would make sure that cleared
sites were not reused in inappropriate ways-one of the principal causes of blight-
but were instead put to the "best and highest use").
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spite the progress of home rule in many states, municipal powers to
regulate or rehabilitate urban blight were quite limited. 33 In part,
this reflected political and fiscal constraints.34 Reformers increas-
ingly understood "blight" as a condition of entire blocks or neigh-
borhoods,35 but cities lacked the capacity to do much more than
fine the occasional landlord or raze the occasional building.36 And
in part, this reflected legal constraints on the local regulation of
private property.37 Indeed, the only substantial legal footing for
urban reform was the "police power" to safeguard the general wel-
fare.38 For this reason, local efforts to address urban conditions
leaned heavily on the threats to health or safety or moral order
that animated local police powers.39 While efforts to eradicate
blighted conditions were limited to land zoning and the authority
of health departments and fire marshals, early definitions of
"blight" did begin to crop up in local health and safety codes.4a
Political attention returned to urban conditions during the Great
Depression, accompanied by the efforts of local, state, and federal
officials to refine the definition of urban blight.4' Not surprisingly,
such definitions drew largely on Progressive-era police powers.42
At a 1930 Housing Conference, the Hoover Administration de-
fined "a slum" as "a residential area where the houses and condi-
tions of life are of such a squalid and wretched character and which
hence has become a social liability to the community. ' 43 In 1937,
33. See id. at 328-29.
34. See id. at 332.
35. See id.
36. See id. at 331-33.
37. See id. at 332.
38. See id.
39. See Keith D. Revell, The Road to Euclid v. Ambler: City Planning, State-Build-
ing, and the Changing Scope of the Police Power, 13 STUDIES IN AM. POLITICAL DEV.
50, 51 (1999).
40. See FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 328-29 (noting that during the low-income
housing movement of the early 1900s, the New York State Board of Housing made it
illegal for a landlord "to maintain a tenement house in such a condition as to continu-
ally menace the health and safety of its occupants").
41. See, e.g., MABEL WALKER, URBAN BLIGHT AND SLUMS 5 (1938) (defining a
blighted area as "[a]n area in which deteriorating forces have obviously reduced eco-
nomic and social values to such a degree that widespread rehabilitation is necessary to
forestall the development of an actual slum condition); see also FOGELSON, supra note
10, at 354-58 (explaining that officials sought to reframe the characterization of blight
so as to allow slum areas to be put to their "best and highest use," rather than to be
slated solely for new and improved low-income housing).
42. See Revell, supra note 39, at 51.
43. WALKER, supra note 41, at 1 (quoting PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE ON HOME
BLDG. & HOME OWNERSHIP, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON BLIGHTED AREAS & SLUMS
1 (1931) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE, BLIGHTED AREAS & SLUMS]).
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the National Association of Housing Officials defined a slum, in
language echoed in the second National Housing Act later that
year,44 as "an area in which predominate dwellings that either be-
cause of dilapidation, obsolescence, overcrowding, poor arrange-
ment or design, lack of ventilation, light or sanitary facilities, or a
combination of these factors, are detrimental to the safety, health,
morals, and comfort of the inhabitants thereof. ' 45 Blight was de-
fined more broadly, because most viewed it not as synonymous
with "slum," but as a set of conditions often analogized as a disease
or a cancer, which resulted in slums.4 6 At the 1930 Hoover Confer-
ence, blight was singled out as an "economic liability" whose de-
mands upon the public purse outstripped its tax revenues.47
"Structures become shabby and obsolete," as one observer wrote
in 1938, "[t]he entire district takes on a down-at-the-heel appear-
ance. The exodus of the more prosperous groups is accelerated.
Rents fall. Poorer classes move in. The poverty of the tenants con-
tributes further to the general air of shabbiness. The realty owner
becomes less and less inclined or able to make repairs."'48
Such efforts to define blight reflected not only the renewed ur-
ban crisis of the 1930s, but also the conviction, especially in the
later New Deal, that urban conditions deserved federal and state
political attention.49 New York in 1926 and New Jersey in 1929, led
the way with laws granting eminent domain to private developers
in exchange for rent controls and other regulatory conditions, but
could not overcome the pervasive obstacles to redevelopment: pri-
vate interests had no incentive to facilitate public policy, and public
interests had no money to acquire or assemble private property.5 °
The National Housing Act of 1937 established a system of loans
and grants-in-aid to local public housing authorities.51 As a com-
promise between real estate interests and housing advocates, the
1937 law made federal funds available for the construction of low-
income housing, but also required the clearance of an equal num-
44. Id. at 2 (quoting United States Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1404 (1937)).
45. Id. at 1 (citing NAT'L ASS'N OF Hous. OFFICIALS, HOUSING OFFICIALS YEAR-
BOOK, 1936, at 243).
46. See id. at 4-5 (discussing several definitions of blighted areas); see also FOGEL-
SON, supra note 10, at 348-49.
47. FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 347-48.
48. WALKER, supra note 41, at 17.
49. FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 334-35, 370-80.
50. See id. at 337-38.
51. Id. at 340.
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ber of "blighted" properties. 52 Refined in 1941, the National Hous-
ing Act pressed state governments to pass enabling legislation-
usually taking the form of sweeping urban redevelopment laws-
under which municipalities could apply for federal funds.53 New
York in 1941 was the first to follow the federal lead,54 and others
followed as depression conditions were displaced by an equally
troubling war-era housing shortage. By 1947, about half of the
states had passed urban redevelopment laws that created quasi-
public redevelopment corporations and endowed them with the
power of eminent domain to clear and prepare "blighted areas" for
redevelopment by private interests.
5 6
These redevelopment corporations were largely inactive until
1949, when a new Federal Housing Act made federal funds availa-
ble for the redevelopment of large areas rather than merely the
removal of discrete slum conditions. 7 Under the new law, local
redevelopment corporations could buy and clear blighted areas
with federal money, sell the land to private developers, and use the
proceeds to cover the redevelopment costs.5 8 This expansive dele-
gation of eminent domain did not go unchallenged, especially by
private interests threatened or displaced by urban redevelopment
plans.59 But state and federal courts persistently held that the
broad public purpose of redevelopment over-rode the claims of in-
dividual property owners, and that resale of cleared properties to
52. GAIL RADFORD, MODERN HOUSING FOR AMERICA: POLICY STRUGGLES IN
THE NEW DEAL ERA 189-90 (1996).
53. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1702 et seq. (1937) (amended 1941); FOGELSON, supra note
10, at 364-66.
54. Jeff Chapman, Tax Increment Financing and Fiscal Stress: The California Gen-
esis, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUC-
TURES AND IMPACT 113, 114 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001); see
FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 364-66 (indicating that New York led the way in abolish-
ing regulations banning insurance companies and other fiduciary institutions from in-
vesting in redevelopment projects).
55. Id. at 364-65.
56. DAVID F. BEATTY ET AL., REDEVELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA 2-3 (1st ed. 1991);
see also Chapman, supra note 54, at 114 (noting that "[i]n 1945, California was the
first state to enact a Community Redevelopment Act that gave cities and counties the
ability to establish redevelopment agencies" and that "[other states followed Califor-
nia's lead").
57. FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 378.
58. Id. at 376-77; see also BEATTY ET AL., supra note 56, at 4; DANIEL R. MAN-
DLEKER ET AL., REVIVING CITIES WIT- TAX ABATEMENT 2-3 (1980).
59. BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INC.: How
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 49-56 (1989).
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private developers amounted to an appropriate public use. 60 As a
Missouri court concluded in dismissing an "equal protection" chal-
lenge to that state's redevelopment law, "Any benefits to private
individuals are merely incidental to the public purpose";61 "[t]he
public purpose... is accomplished when the blight is cleared and
the area redeveloped, and it is to [the redevelopment corporation]
and . . . the lessee that the city looks for accomplishment of that
purpose." 62
Federal law deferred the definition and determination of
"blighted areas" to the state governments that enabled the redevel-
opment corporations and the local governments that administered
them.63 Most states, in fact, stopped short of defining blight and
instead offered a descriptive catalogue of blighted conditions-
often pasted verbatim from Progressive-era health or safety stat-
utes.64 In Missouri, for example, a blighted area was one in which:
by reason of the predominance of defective or inadequate street
layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deterioration of site im-
provements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, the exis-
tence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and
other causes, or any combination of such factors, retards the
provision of housing accommodations or constitutes an eco-
nomic or social liability or a menace to the public health, safety,
morals, or welfare in its present condition and use. 6
5
In New Jersey, blight was defined as any one of a number of condi-
tions, including buildings which were "substandard, unsafe, insani-
tary [sic], dilapidated, or obsolescent," discontinued industrial uses,
unimproved vacant land "not likely to be developed through the
instrumentality of private capital," and "lack of proper utiliza-
tion."' 66 In California, a blighted area was characterized
by the existence of buildings and structures . . . which are unfit
or unsafe to occupy for such purposes and are conducive to ill
60. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32-34 (1954); Land Clearance for Redevel-
opment Auth. of St. Louis v. St. Louis, 270 S.W.2d 58, 64 (Mo. 1954); Wilson v. Long
Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 842-43 (N.J. 1958); see also Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 992-94.
61. Annbar Assoc. v. W. Side Redevelopment Corp., 397 S.W.2d 635, 643, 646
(Mo. 1965) (citing State v. Land Clearance Redevelopment Auth. of Kansas City, 270
S.W.2d 44, 53 (Mo. 1954)) (emphasis omitted).
62. Id. at 651.
63. See FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 378.
64. See Detwiler & Dale, supra note 13, at 3-5; see also Chapman, supra note 54, at
115.
65. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 99.805 (West 1982) (amended 1986 and 1997).
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55-21.1 (West 1949) (repealed 1992) (replaced by N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5 (1992) (amended 2003)).
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health, transmission of disease, infant mortality, juvenile delin-
quency, and crime because of any one or a combination of the
following factors: [d]efective design and character of physical
construction[; f]aulty interior arrangement and exterior spac-
ing[; h]igh density of population and overcrowding[; i]nadequate
provision for ventilation, light, sanitation, open spaces, and rec-
reation facilities[; and alge, obsolescence, deterioration, dilapi-
dation, mixed character, or shifting of uses.67
While federal urban renewal was replaced in 1974 with the Com-
munity Development Block Grant program ("CDBG"), 68state re-
development statutes and their Dickensian descriptions of "blight"
persisted.69 More importantly, the blight language was grafted into
new laws, including the profusion of TIF laws in the 1970s and
1980s. 70 As a strategy for redevelopment, TIF is an innovative
marriage of conventional local property tax abatement and pub-
licly subsidized urban renewal.71 Under a typical TIF statute, the
costs or risks of redevelopment are borne by local government in
the form of new infrastructure, land clearance, or construction
loans. 71 This debt, which is often bond-financed, is then repaid
with the property tax increase, or increment, that follows redevel-
opment.73 California pioneered the TIF in 1952 as a way of coming
up with matching funds for federal programs when local voters
failed to approve local bonds. 4 Only six other states adopted TIF
statutes before 1970,'7 but a flurry of circumstances-the end of
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (Deering 1974) (amended 1993).
68. See Audrey G. McFarlane, When Inclusion Leads to Exclusion: The Uncharted
Terrain of Community Participation in Economic Development, 66 BROOK L. REV.
861, 880 (2000); Jon C. Teaford, Urban Renewal and its Aftermath, Hous. POL'Y DE-
BATE, VOl. 11, Issue 2, at 443, 459 (2000).
69. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
70. See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1024-25, 1046-47.
71. See NCBG, WHO PAYS, supra note 2, at 3; cf. MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note
58, at 5 (explaining that while TIF has some consequences similar to tax abatement, it
cannot be properly characterized as such; property taxes are not actually abated as
revenues are diverted to pay off bonds issued to finance redevelopment projects).
72. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 927-28 (stating that a municipality typically
bonds to pay the cost of the project whether for land clearance or to prepare for the
developer).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 925; see also BEATrY ET AL., supra note 56, at 6-7; Craig L. Johnson &
Kenneth A. Kriz, A Review of State Tax Increment Financing Laws, in TAX INCRE-
MENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES AND IMPACT
31, 31 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
75. The six states to pass TIFs between 1951 and 1970 were Minnesota, Nevada,
Ohio, Oregon, Washington and Wyoming. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 74, at 31.
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federal urban renewal in 1974,76 the protracted urban fiscal crisis of
the 1970s,77 and the property tax revolts of the late 1970s78_
pressed. the issue. By 2000, only three states did not have TIFs on
the books. 79 TIF statutes echoed and expanded the older statutory
definition of blight, typically grafting economic considerations,
such as underutilization of land, uneven commercial development
and insufficient tax revenues, onto the older "health and welfare"
notion of urban blight.8° The result, as I suggest below, was an
almost complete debasement and deregulation of "blight" as a
guiding designation for urban renewal and redevelopment. 8
II. THE USE AND ABUSE OF "BLIGHT"
The pioneers of postwar urban renewal, let alone Jacob Riis and
his contemporaries,82 would be more than a little surprised at the
ways in which public money is now dedicated to the cause of eradi-
cating urban blight.8 3 Part of the problem lies in the tangle of in-
tergovernmental relations typical of urban public policy.' 4 During
the heyday of urban renewal, between 1949 and 1974, urban rede-
velopment corporations were established by state law, adminis-
tered by local officials who were usually unelected, and funded
76. See McFarlane, supra note 68, at 880-81; see also FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra
note 59, at 153 ("[T]he removal of most federal rules after urban renewal failed in
1974 invited cities to improvise their own ways of managing development.").
77. See Joyce Y. Man, Detriments of the Municipal Decision to Adopt Tax Incre-
ment Financing, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
UsEs, STRUCTURES AND IMPACT 87, 88 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
78. Id. at 92-93.
79. As of 2000, only Delaware and North Carolina had not passed TIF laws. John-
son & Kriz, supra note 74, at 31. And state courts held West Virginia's 1995 law
unconstitutional. Boone County v. Cooke, 475 S.E.2d 483, 494 (W. Va. 1996).
80. E.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (1993); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 99.805
(West 1982) (amended 1986 and 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5 (1992)
(amended 2003); see also Goshorn, supra note 3, at 928-29 (highlighting the expansive
definition of "blighted area" in the Missouri statute, provided as an example of a
typical TIF statute).
81. Goshorn, supra note 3, at 922 (noting that the expansion of the meaning of the
word "blighted" leads to the "redevelopment" of areas neither intuitively nor ration-
ally considered "blighted," contrary to the intent of the TIF statute as a tool of last
resort); see also supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text (providing specific exam-
ples of TIF statutes' misuse).
82. See generally Riis, supra note 25, passim (commenting on the problems of New
York slum life to initiate reform).
83. See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
84. See infra notes 85-88 and accompanying text; see also Chapman, supra note 54,
at 114-15 (noting that although the states had the authority to regulate land use, the
restrictions associated with federal money shaped the programs).
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largely with federal money.85 In more recent decades, state rede-
velopment statutes have been joined by a patchwork of state TIF
laws; development is initiated by a combination of local officials,
redevelopment corporations, and private developers; local projects
are often effectively funded by other local tax entities, such as
school districts and counties; and federal money and standards
have largely evaporated.86 Local governments, under cover of
vague state laws and beguiled by the prospect of capturing federal
grants or a larger tax base, have every incentive to define blight
expansively. 87 And they have done so successfully, either by offer-
ing imaginative interpretations of older blight definitions, or by
taking advantage of a more recent deregulation of those
definitions.88
A. From Housing to Economic Development
Through the first half of the twentieth century, blight was under-
stood as a condition of substandard housing, and "eradicating
blight" meant providing decent homes for urban working fami-
lies. 89 But even amidst the worries about a postwar housing crunch
that animated state and federal efforts in the 1940s, urban housing
policy was already adrift.90 Federal urban renewal was compro-
mised by a raft of more generous federal policies, including high-
way spending, mortgage insurance, and accelerated depreciation
for new developments, which subsidized and facilitated suburban
flight.91 Federal housing policy, as we have seen, was already com-
mitted to improving the housing stock without increasing it.92 And,
under constant pressure from local and real estate interests, Con-
85. Chapman, supra note 54, at 114.
86. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 926-28; see also Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 998-
1000.
87. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 923 (illustrating that "[m]unicipalities have an
incentive to offer large TIF packages to private developers to entice them to build
within the particular municipality").
88. Id. at 922-23.
89. EDITH ELMER WOOD, FEDERAL EMERGENCY ADMIN. OF PuB. WORKS, Hous-
ING DIVISION BULLETIN No. 1: SLUMS AND BLIGHTED AREAS IN THE UNITED STATES
1-16 (1935) (describing substandard housing and the many social ills thought to be
associated with such conditions).
90. See Chapman, supra note 54, at 114.
91. FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 317-19 (chronicling the unanticipated flight from
the central business district as a result of urban renewal).
92. See id. at 340, 344-46 (noting that according to the Housing Act of 1937 "at
least one substandard dwelling had to be eliminated for each new dwelling con-
structed in every project" and evidencing a shift from an intention to provide im-
proved housing to an intention to improve urban areas generally).
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gress opened the door for the use of federal funds for non-residen-
tial development.93 While the Federal Housing Act of 1949
defined blighted areas as "predominantly residential," it did not
require cities or developers to erect affordable housing on
redeveloped districts.94 And Congress gradually amended the
"residential threshold," allowing up to ten percent of federal funds
to be spent on commercial development in 1954, and increasing
this percentage to thirty-five in 1965. 91
As importantly, urban redevelopment policy was increasingly
distracted by the concerns of realtors, developers, and business
leaders representing the central business district ("CBD"). 96 Be-
tween the wars, business interests had been wary of urban policy,
especially given the threats to private interests posed by eminent
domain and public housing.97 Increasingly however, urban busi-
ness leaders saw urban redevelopment as a means of loosening the
"dirty collar" of substandard housing that encircled most central
business districts. 98 These interests, however, had little patience
with redevelopment plans that proposed to repopulate cleared
slums with working families who neither shopped nor worked in
the CBD.99 Instead, slum clearance would pave the way for CBD
expansion or higher-end housing." At the same time, state and
local politicians were leery of the costs of urban redevelopment
and eager to reap its benefits.101 Accordingly, they tended to agree
with CBD leaders that low-income and middle-income housing did
not match the immense acquisition costs or economic potential of
urban redevelopment. 0 2 At the intersection of these private and
93. See id. at 355 (arguing that low income housing in the slums and blighted areas
adjacent to the central business district was not necessarily the "best and highest" use
of the land and suggesting alternative uses such as commerce, industry, parks, play-
grounds, parking lots or garages).
94. Id. at 378; see also Teaford, supra note 68, at 444.
95. BEATTY ET AL., supra note 56, at 4; see Teaford, supra note 68, at 444-45.
96. See FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 342-43 (discussing concerns on the part of
downtown business interests related to the unexpected effects of decentralization).
97. See id. at 337-39 (recounting the conflict between New York real estate and
business interests and the nation's leading housing reformers, which resulted in the
grant of the power of eminent domain by the city to private redevelopment compa-
nies for the purpose of slum clearance and low-income housing).
98. See id. at 344-45.
99. See id. at 345, 353-58.
100. See id. at 345-46, 353-58.
101. See id. at 346-50 (describing how central business district interests were able to
encourage an expansive definition of blight in pursuit of urban renewal, sapping focus
on and interest in improved low-cost housing).
102. Id. at 346-50, 353-58.
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public anxieties, urban redevelopment policies took a decisive
turn. 10 3 Slums were to be cleared not for better housing, but for a
more abstract faith in local economic development and growth.10 4
Targeted areas were identified less by demonstrable need than by
the willingness of private interests to invest in redevelopment. 10 5
Redevelopment, in turn, rested on an increasingly elastic definition
of "blight" that put the health of the CBD at the top of the urban
agenda.'06
Under state law, the drift from residential to commercial rede-
velopment was even more pronounced.107 Most state laws echoed
the federal presumption that blight and its rehabilitation were
"predominantly residential" concerns, but also offered other pre-
texts for redevelopment. 0 8 New Jersey's 1949 Blighted Areas Act,
for example, included in its expansive blight definition not only
"substandard, unsafe, insanitary [sic], dilapidated, or obsolescent"
buildings, but also "discontinued industrial uses," unimproved va-
cant land "not likely to be developed through the instrumentality
of private capital," and "lack of proper utilization.' ' 0 9 Indeed, the
attention and resources of local redevelopment corporations, with
the blessing of state courts, were increasingly devoted to office
buildings and hotels and shopping malls.110 As redevelopment
plans were challenged, particularly by displaced commercial inter-
ests, the courts consistently held that urban redevelopment was
"not solely to provide for slum clearance" and that designations of
103. Infra notes 104-106 and accompanying text.
104. See FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 355-56; see also FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra
note 59, at 29-30 (noting the adverse effects of such policies on inner-city minority
groups).
105. See MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 4 (discussing the role of private
interests in TIF financed redevelopment).
106. FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 345-50.
107. See infra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Levin v. Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 4 (N.J. 1971) (explaining that while
the federal Housing Act of 1949 required that such land be redeveloped for
"predominantly residential uses," subsequent amendments have provided that local
governments can redevelop areas for nonresidential uses if they determine the use to
be "necessary and appropriate to facilitate the growth of the community").
109. N.J. STAT. ANN. 40:55-21.1 (West 1949) (repealed 1992) (replaced by N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-5 (1992) (amended 2003)); see also Wilson v. Long Branch,
142 A.2d 837, 842 (N.J. 1958).
110. E.g., Michel, supra note 4, at 457, 462-63 (providing examples of the types of
controversial development projects financed via TIF schemes in Indiana and explain-
ing that the courts acquiesced and validated such uses by adopting a broad definition
of blight).
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blight were appropriate even if no portion of the redevelopment
zone could reasonably be considered "a slum." '
Non-residential definitions of blight, and local discretion in inter-
preting them, exploded with the collapse of federal urban renewal
in 1974 and the profusion of state TIF laws. 112 Local officials in St.
Louis, for example, admitted in 1975 that the deterioration of non-
residential property could not be shoehorned into the old police
power definition of blight conditions as those conducive to ill
health, transmission of disease, or crime.1 3 But they did not hesi-
tate to expand that definition to include any condition "conducive
to the inability to pay reasonable taxes. 11 4 Most TIF laws added
"economic development" clauses, essentially allowing local govern-
ments to add slow economic growth or the threat of future eco-
nomic decline to their working definitions of blight. a15 In Missouri,
for example, the 1982 TIF statute recommends the use of TIFs to
"discourage commerce, industry or manufacturing from moving
their operations to another state," "result in increased employ-
ment," or "result in the preservation or enhancement of the tax
base of the municipality.""' 6 In Alaska, a 2002 revision added any
"area that is capable of being substantially improved based on the
property value" to its TIF-eligible definitions.1 1 7 In Georgia, the
TIF statute was amended in 2001 to include any previously devel-
oped parcel "in which the current condition of the area is less de-
sirable than the redevelopment of the area."1" 8 In Virginia, the
word "blight" was struck entirely from the state's TIF law in 1990,
111. See Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974); Levin, 274 A.2d at 19 (N.J. 1971); Cannata v. New York,
182 N.E.2d 395, 397 (N.Y. 1962).
112. See generally FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 59, at 153 ("[T]he removal of
most federal rules after urban renewal folded in 1974 invited cities to improvise their
own ways of managing development.").
113. See CITy PLAN COMM'N (St. Louis), BLIGHTING STUDY: AREA BOUNDED BY
TWELFTH, CLARK, ELEVENTH, AND WALNUT Box 9:123 (1969) (on file St. Louis Data
Collection, W. Historical Manuscripts Collection, Jefferson Library, Univ. of Mo.-St.
Louis).
114. Id.; Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (2003) (including "such conditions [as] are
conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable
taxes" in its definition of a blighted area).
115. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 929-30.
116. See id. at 929; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.805(3), (5) (1982) (amended 1986,
1991 and 1997).
117. ALASKA STAT. § 29.47.460 (Michie 2003).
118. GA. CODE ANN. § 36-44-3(7)(F) (2002).
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expanding the law's public purpose from combating blight to pro-
moting "commerce and prosperity." 119
Because TIFs use future tax revenues to finance redevelopment,
they are actually ill-suited to conventional residential urban re-
newal, which usually involves significant up-front costs for land ac-
quisition and clearance. ° While early federal urban renewal
policies sought to leverage investment in the rehabilitation of genu-
inely blighted areas, TIFs depend upon dramatic increases in prop-
erty value, and as a result, are geared more toward new
commercial investment-often in well-heeled suburban
neighborhoods. 
121
Therefore, while TIFs generally require a finding of "blight,"
they often turn that notion on its head. In greater St. Louis, for
example, TIFs are almost exclusively pursued by fringe communi-
ties competing for new shopping malls.a22 In such settings, TIF
subsidies are sought because the property in question is too expen-
sive for developers to assemble on their own.123 This leads, as one
observer notes, to "the odd phenomenon of blight selling for top
dollar.' 24 As the St. Louis Post-Dispatch concludes, "Twenty
years ago, the Missouri Legislature passed the TIF law to give
blighted, older communities a chance to compete for development
with more affluent suburban areas like .. .well .. .the Galleria
area[,] ... [but] over the years developers learned to play TIF Rou-
lette with municipalities."'
1 25
In some states, the economic development clauses are more re-
strictive. 126 In Iowa, for example, redevelopment under the eco-
nomic development designation cannot subsidize new housing
without setting aside a percentage of project costs equal to the lo-
cal percentage of low and moderate income families for affordable
119. ALYSSA TALANKER ET AL., GOOD JoBs FIRST, STRAYING FROM GOOD INTEN-
TIONS: How STATES ARE WEAKENING ENTERPRISE ZONE AND TAX INCREMENT Fi-
NANCING PROGRAMS 23 (Aug. 2003), available at http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/pdf/
straying.pdf.
120. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 920, 927-28.
121. Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1004.
122. See THOMAS LUCE, BROOKINGS INST. CTR. ON URB. & METRO. POL'Y, RE-
CLAIMING THE INTENT: TAX INCREMENT FINANCE IN THE KANSAS CITY AND ST.
LouIs METROPOLITAN AREAS 8-11 (2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/
urban/publications/lucetif.pdf.
123. See A Tale of Two TIFs, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Feb. 20, 2003, at B6.
124. Id.
125. Blight and the Galleria, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Apr. 24, 2002, at B6.
126. See, e.g., IOWA CODE § 403.22 (2002) (requiring that projects include assis-
tance for low and moderate income family housing).
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housing.127 In Indiana, redevelopment under the economic devel-
opment designation cannot use the power of eminent domain.
128
In practice, however, such restrictions carry little weight. 129 In
looking to fund a given proposal, local officials will typically shop
around in the state code for the least restrictive designation-rely-
ing on findings of blight when they can, turning to economic devel-
opment or conservation designations when a credible case for
blight is hard to make, and falling back on the tabula rasa of blight
if another designation threatens to complicate a proposed
development. 130
B. Local Discretion: What is Blight?
In practice, local governments or redevelopment corporations
have enjoyed wide latitude in defining or determining blight.131 In
most states, this reflects the "laundry list" of health and safety con-
cerns that often serves as the only statutory definition. 132 Under
such laws, local officials or developers need only identify one of
these problems in a redevelopment area in order to qualify the en-
tire area as blighted. 13 3 Not only do most states lack any quantifi-
able baseline, such as household income, property value, or
percentage of vacant buildings, for the determination of blight,134
127. Id.
128. Michel, supra note 4, at 459.
129. See id. at 463 (stating that in Indiana, any area that suffers from a lack of
development, contains deteriorated buildings or has been abandoned is subject to the
redevelopment commission's power of eminent domain).
130. See generally NCBG, WHO PAYS, supra note 2, at 12 (stating that as TIF pro-
grams have developed, more and more neighborhoods that do not meet a common
sense definition of "blight" are being pulled into their reach).
131. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 922-23 (explaining how TIF statutes are worded
broadly in order to encompass many projects in the definition of blight).
132. E.g., Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.805(1) (1982) (amended 1986, 1991 and 1997) (in-
cluding "defective or inadequate street layout, unsanitary or unsafe conditions, deteri-
oration of site improvements, improper subdivision or obsolete platting, . . . the
existence of conditions which endanger life or property by fire and other causes, [and]
any combination of such factors [that] retards the provision of housing accommoda-
tions or constitutes an economic or social liability or a menace to the public health,
safety, morals, or welfare" in the definition of a "blighted area"); see also DEL. CODE
ANN. Tit. 31, § 4501 (2003) (providing that a "blighted" area is any "portion of a
municipality or community which is found and determined to be a social or economic
liability").
133. Michel, supra note 4, at 463; Reinert, note 16, at 1047-48.
134. Only seven states-Alabama, Arkansas, California, Massachusetts, Minne-
sota, Nebraska and South Dakota-hold the designation of "blighted area" to any
quantifiable standard. See ALA. CODE § 11-99-4 (1975); ARK. CODE ANN. § 14-168-
301 (Michie 2001); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33030.1(b) (West 1999); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. Ch. 121B, § 1 (West 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.002 (West
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but there is also little sense as to whether such a baseline should
reflect national, state, or local standards.'35 Indeed, redevelopment
officials need not even find that a redevelopment area is demon-
strably poorer or in worse condition than its surrounding area. 13
6
One 1969 effort in St. Louis to quantify blight using an elaborate
"factor analysis" index weighing 1) local, or neighborhood, and re-
gional, or census tract, patterns of land use; 2) crowding; 3) build-
ing quality; 4) average rents and assessed values; and 5) school and
crime statistics-concluded that its empiricism was eroded by the
fact that "virtually all of these ... original measures were 'opinions'
or 'judgments' about what constituted quality.' '1 37
For their part, the courts have been largely untroubled by this
imprecision. 138 When plaintiffs argued, in a 1974 case in Missouri,
that a municipality had violated its "customary standard of
,blight,' the trial court found "no reference to any such standards
or guidelines" in state or local law. 39 In a similar 1978 case in New
Jersey, the court held that a municipality must make a formal de-
termination of blight, including public hearings, but that there need
not be any clear criteria for such a finding.' 40
What makes such local discretion all the more troubling is that
fact that the designation of blight often occurs on a proposal-by-
proposal basis, at the behest of developers.' Blighting, in other
2001); NEB. REV. STAT. 13-1101 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 11-7-3 (Michie 2003);
see also Johnson & Kriz, supra note 74, at 38-39. But such standards generally only
control the scale of the TIF or redevelopment region by requiring that a certain per-
centage of properties within the region are-in what is still a highly subjective deter-
mination-"blighted." Alabama, for example, requires that "[n]ot less than 50
percent, by area, of the real property within the tax increment district is a blighted
area and is in need of rehabilitation." ALA. CODE § 11-99-4; see also Johnson & Kriz,
supra note 74, at 38-39.
135. See generally Purver, supra note 1, § 2(b) (noting that what constitutes a
blighted area "is a legislative question, political in nature and involving questions of
public policy").
136. See MICHAEL DARDIA, PUB. POL'Y INST. OF CALIFORNIA, SUBSIDIZING REDE-
VELOPMENT IN CALIFORNIA 59-60 (1998), available at http://www.ppic.org/content/
pubs/R 298MDR.pdf; Reinert, supra note 16, at 1033-34.
137. ALAN VOORHEES & Assoc., TECHNICAL REPORT ON A RESIDENTIAL BLIGHT
ANALYSIS FOR ST. Louis, MISSOURI Box 9:125 (1969) (on file St. Louis Data Collec-
tion, W. Historical Manuscripts Collection, Jefferson Library, Univ. of Mo.-St. Louis).
138. Infra notes 139-140 and accompanying text.
139. Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518
S.W.2d 11, 16 (Mo. 1974).
140. Weehawken Env't Comm. v. Weehawken, 391 A.2d 968, 972-73 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1978).
141. Oberndorf v. Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (10th Cir. 1990); Allright Mo.,
Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d 320, 322 (Mo. 1976); Parking
Sys. Inc., 518 S.W.2d at 13; Levin v. Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 21 (N.J. 1971).
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words, is driven.not by objective urban conditions, but by the pros-
pect of private investment.' 42 In practice, this has meant that in-
vestment is actually steered away from the most dismal urban
conditions, as private interests seek the "blight that's right"-an
area with at least some of the conditions needed to make a plausi-
ble case for subsidized redevelopment, but not so run-down as to
put private investment at risk.143 As early as 1975, local develop-
ment corporations in St. Louis understood their "public purpose"
as little more than providing "interested developers with the incen-
tive to revitalize the area with new and expanded facilities.' 1 44 In
the scramble to TIF new retail developments in the St. Louis sub-
urbs, for example, the designation of blight was typically sought
after local development officials had reached a tentative agreement
with a new anchor store. 45 "A tame consulting firm hired by the
city of Richmond Heights last week declared that the Galleria
neighborhood is 'blighted' too," observed one local critic; "[a]s
Yogi Berra said,146 nobody goes there any more, it's too
crowded.
1 4 7
Not surprisingly, this piecemeal and often inventive pattern of
blighting has sparked legal challenges-especially from commercial
interests displaced by redevelopment, forced to compete with new
businesses in the redevelopment area or unsuccessful themselves in
their bids for redevelopment contracts.1 48 But state courts have al-
most invariably upheld local designations of blight, deferring to lo-
cal legislative authority in determining both the meaning of blight
and the larger public purpose served by redevelopment.1 49 As long
142. See Oberndorf, 900 F.2d at 1439; Allright Mo., 538 S.W.2d at 322; Parking Sys.
Inc., 518 S.W.2d at 13; Levin, 274 A.2d at 21.
143. Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 995-96.
144. A.T. REDEVELOPMENT CORP. PROPOSAL Box 16 (Apr. 1975) (on file John
Poelker Papers, Wash. U. Archives, Clayton, Mo.).
145. See, e.g., Mihalopoulos, West County Mall Wins Initial Backing, supra note 17,
at Cl (explaining that in the case of the West County Mall, the developer sought a
blight designation after reaching tentative agreements that "[t]he expanded mall
would triple the number of specialty stores to 150 and add two new anchor stores,
including the first Nordstrom department store in the St. Louis area").
146. See YOGI BERRA ET AL., THE YOGI BOOK: "I REALLY DIDN'T SAY EVERY-
THING I SAID" 16 (Workman Publ'g Co. 1998).
147. JG St. Louis W. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 514-20 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001); Blight and the Galleria, supra note 125, at B6.
148. See Reinert, supra note 16, at 1019-20.
149. See, e.g., Allright Mo., Inc. v. Civic Plaza Redevelopment Corp., 538 S.W.2d
320, 324 (Mo. 1976) (holding that judicial review of legislative judgment that an area
is blighted is limited to whether the legislative determination was arbitrary; the court
cannot substitute its opinion for the city council's); Parking Sys., Inc. v. Kansas City
Downtown Redevelopment Corp., 518 S.W.2d 11, 15 (Mo. 1974) (holding that judicial
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as the local decision was not "clearly arbitrary or unreasonable," ''
judges refused to second-guess the many ways local officials might
determine that an area could "no longer meet the economic and
social needs of modern city life.' 1 51 Only rarely have the courts
rejected local blight designations, usually in circumstances involv-
ing redevelopment areas that were substantially non-urban. 152 For
their part, developers have appreciated the leeway afforded by
state law, noting in one New Jersey case that even if an area was
"not sufficiently blighted or developed enough" to qualify for fed-
eral grants, it was "a simple matter.., to make a survey for eligibil-
ity [under state law] which will hold up in the Courts. 153
C. Local Discretion: The "But For" Test
In many states, fourteen of those with TIF statutes1 54 and more
under older redevelopment laws, 55 the designation of blight is ac-
companied by a "but for" provision, intended to ensure that rede-
velopment, as one observer notes, "produce[s] the desired
entrepreneurial response rather than merely subsidize[s] develop-
ment which would have occurred without it."' 56 Missouri's TIF
statute, for example, requires that a prospective TIF zone "has not
been subject to growth and development through investment by
private enterprise and would not reasonably be anticipated to be
developed without the adoption of tax increment financing."'1 57 In
Indiana, the statute requires that a project not be feasible through
the "ordinary operations of private enterprise."158
But there are many problems with such conditions.'59 Only a
handful of states, including Kansas, require comprehensive feasibil-
review of legislative determination that an area was blighted is limited to whether that
determination was arbitrary or was induced by fraud, collusion or bad faith, or
whether the city exceeded its power).
150. Los Angeles v. Gage, 274 P.2d 34, 45 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1954); see also
Schweig v. St. Louis, 569 S.W.2d 215, 223 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Allright Mo., 538
S.W.2d at 324; Parking Sys., 518 S.W.2d at 16; Detwiler & Dale, supra note 13, at 3-4;
MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 83; Michel, supra note 4, at 462-63; Reinert,
supra note 16, at 1039-42.
151. MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 95 (citing Oliver v. Clairton, 98 A.2d 47,
52 (Pa. 1953)).
152. See Purver, supra note 1, §§ 3, 13.
153. Levin v. Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 9 (N.J. 1971) (emphasis removed).
154. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 74, at 39.
155. See id.
156. MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 21.
157. Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.810 (2003).
158. Michel, supra note 4, at 459 (quoting IND. CODE § 36-7-14-15 (1993)).
159. Infra notes 160-172 and accompanying text.
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ity studies to satisfy the "but for" test.160 As a rule, the "but for"
test is a purely local determination-meaning that there is no con-
sideration of state or regional or metropolitan concerns-including
the possibility that development might occur elsewhere without
subsidy, or that "new" investment is merely being pirated from
elsewhere.161 In most states, "reasonable anticipation" of private
development is calculated by the very interests vested in the pro-
posed TIF deal-often in the form of affidavits from private devel-
opers attesting to their unwillingness to proceed without public
subsidy.1 62 In this sense, the "but for" test lets private developers
define blight by letting them define the likelihood of natural eco-
nomic growth in a given area.
1 63
The "but for" test is further constrained by the fascination of
local officials with a certain kind or quality of development. 1" This
"edifice complex" presses urban and suburban legislators to favor
large, often symbolic, development-"brick and mortar symbols to
demonstrate their accomplishments" or their "competence to man-
age development. '' 165 It is not at all uncommon, for example, for
development officials to rebuff unsubsidized private investment in
an area because they are holding out for a given investor or ten-
ant-often a "big box" chain retailer or an upscale department
store. 166 Although local redevelopment powers flow from local po-
lice powers to protect public safety and morals, they have increas-
ingly come to rely on an expansive definition of "the general public
welfare" in which the goal is not simply to eradicate blight and
stimulate development, but to control the pace and quality of de-
velopment as well.
167
160. See Johnson & Kriz, supra note 74, at 39.
161. See LUCE, supra note 122, at 7.
162. See Jonathan M. Davidson, Tax Increment Financing as a Tool for Community
Redevelopment, 56 U. DET. J. URB. L. 405, 409 (1979) ("Most statutes require ...
findings that ... private initiatives are unlikely to alleviate these conditions without
substantial public assistance."); see also Goshorn, supra note 3, at 929-30 (using the
example of Missouri's TIF statute to suggest that the law encourages private initia-
tives to receive public assistance).
163. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 922-23 ("[T]he broadly-worded [Missouri TIF]
statute allows many projects to technically fall under the statute's definition of
'blight,' when in fact the economic health of these areas is sufficient to garner ade-
quate private investment.").
164. Michel, supra note 4, at 470.
165. FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 59, at 281; Michel, supra note 4, at 470, 470
n.99.
166. See, e.g., Fred Faust, Businesses Angry Over Use of TIE; Rival Redevelopment
Plan Didn't Need Tax Subsidy, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1996, at 1E.
167. Levin v. Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 24 (N.J. 1971) (Haneman, J. dissenting).
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Finally, the very logic of tax-increment financing undermines the
"but for" test.168 In order to work, TIF zones must both minimize
the up-front costs of land clearance and rehabilitation and prove
their ability to begin paying off the underlying debt.169 For these
reasons, redevelopment authorities avoid genuinely blighted urban
areas and devote their attention to those, in which private develop-
ers are already poised to invest.17° Neither the taxing municipality
nor private investors, in other words, are likely to risk TIFs in areas
in which economic growth is not already assured. 17 1 Not surpris-
ingly, as careful studies of local TIF policy have suggested, it is
often a stretch to attribute an increase in property tax assessments
to the TIF rather than to an otherwise quite predictable trajectory
of economic growth. 172
D. Finding Blight: The Redevelopment Area that ate the City
Although local officials have considerable discretion in "blight-
ing," they nevertheless must make a credible case that a given re-
development area is deserving of public subsidy or public
attention. 73 This is often accomplished as much by stretching the
redevelopment area itself as it is by stretching the definition of
blight. 174 The larger the urban renewal area of a TIF district, as a
rule, the easier it is to find blighted conditions inside it and use
public interest in planning to meet the objections of affected prop-
erty owners. 175 This strategy emerged first in federal housing and
urban renewal, which steadily expanded its focus from individual
properties in 1934, to housing projects in 1937 and 1949, to neigh-
borhoods in 1956, and then to entire urban areas in 1959.176 State
168. See infra notes 169-172 and accompanying text.
169. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 938; see also Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1003-05.
170. Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1003-05.
171. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 938-42; Faust, supra note 166, at 1E.
172. See NCBG, WHO PAYS, supra note 2, at 21-24.
173. See Levin v. Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. 1971) (requiring "substantial
evidence ... to support the action taken").
174. See, e.g., MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 6 (explaining that although the
"blighted areas" designated by the Missouri legislation arguably do not meet the in-
tent of the definition of "blight," all of downtown St. Louis has been "blighted" any-
way due to relaxed interpretations of the definition); see also infra notes 178-179 and
accompanying text.
175. See Levin, 274 A.2d at 5; cf Purver, supra note 1, § 2(a) ("Because of the
economic and social interdependence of different communities and different areas
within single communities, the redevelopment of land in such blighted areas is accom-
plished under urban renewal programs in accordance with comprehensive plans to
promote the sound growth of the community.").
176. Levin, 274 A.2d at 5.
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redevelopment laws and local redevelopment corporations fol-
lowed this trend.177 By the early 1970's, for example, virtually all
of downtown St. Louis had been blighted under Missouri's "Chap-
ter 353" urban redevelopment statute,178 and by the late 1990s,
more than half of the property in the entire city was either tax-
abated, blighted for redevelopment, or tax-exempt. The extent of
these conditions concerned even the St. Louis Development Cor-
poration, which viewed them as evidence of a dangerous addiction
to tax abatement and a serious threat to the city's finances.179
Local control over the size and boundaries of redevelopment ar-
eas resembles the politics of congressional re-districting, 180 and in-
deed redevelopment areas are often gerrymandered in such a way
as to encompass both commercial parcels targeted for development
and enough blighted area to justify the development.' 8' Berman v.
Parker, the Supreme Court case which upheld federal urban re-
newal policies in 1954, established the rule followed faithfully by
state courts that "blight" was a characteristic of a given redevelop-
ment area, and not necessarily of individual properties within it.' 8 '
This gave local officials the incentive to draw expansive redevelop-
ment areas, constrained only by the rule that such areas not be
composed of non-contiguous parcels.'83 Nonetheless, in one New
Jersey case, the redevelopment area reached twenty-three feet in
the air at one point in order to reach a second parcel of land while
blighting only the airspace between them.'8 4
This strategy is exaggerated in TIF politics, because the bounda-
ries of the redevelopment area simultaneously capture increases in
177. See id.; MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 71-75.
178. MANDLEKER ET AL., supra note 58, at 6, 74.
179. See Linda Tucci, City Addicted to Abatement Exacts Heavy Toll on Schools,
Study Says, ST. Louis Bus. J. (Jan. 12, 1998), available at http://stlouis.bizjournals.
comlstlouis/stories/1998/01/12/storyl.html.
180. See, e.g., Jane Maslow Cohen, Equality for Girls and Other Women: The Built
Architecture of the Purpose of the Purposive Life, 9 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 103,
131 (1998) (discussing the rigging of irrational districts to create a constituency of
largely minority voters).
181. Oberndorf v. Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1438-40 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that
blight need not exist on every block in order to necessitate redevelopment).
182. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35 (1954); Purver, supra note 1, § 3 (explaining
that Congress looks to the need of the area as a whole).
183. See, e.g., Oberndorf, 900 F.2d at 1438-39 (finding that fifteen consecutive
blocks constituted a significant blighted area).
184. Purver, supra note 1, §§ 2(b), 3 (explaining that liberal use of the rules of con-
struction allows airspace to be construed as blighted) (citing Jersey City Chapter of
the Prop. Owners' Protective Ass'n v. City Council, 259 A.2d 698, 704 (N.J. 1969)).
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property taxes, and sometimes, sales taxes. 18 5 The larger the TIF
district, the easier it is to argue for redevelopment around "one big
plan and one big developer."' 86 And the larger the TIF district, the
more stable the increment claimed to retire project costs. 187 This
pattern was exaggerated by the property tax revolts of the late
1970s.188 In California, for example, the average redevelopment
area doubled in size-to over 800 acres-in the wake of the infa-
mous "Proposition 13" clamp on property taxes. 89
E. The Specter of Future Blight
Local development officials also had some success in raising the
specter of "future blight" in arguing for redevelopment of areas
not yet blighted, but likely to become so.190 Such notions, in part,
rested on a longstanding conviction that blight was not a physical
description, but a set of circumstances or conditions: blight was the
disease, slums were the result and redevelopment was the cure. T9
As one federal housing official suggested in the early 1930s, a
blighted area was "on the down grade ... a potential slum ''192 or
"an insidious malady that attacks urban residential districts. It ap-
pears first as a barely noticeable deterioration and then progresses
gradually through many stages toward a final condition known as
the slum. '193 Federal urban renewal law picked up this reason-
185. See Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1023-25.
186. Faust, supra note 166, at 1E (citing an area in St. Louis where various develop-
ers are competing to develop a large strip mall).
187. Cf. id.
188. See Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1003-08; see also ARTHUR O'SULLIVAN ET AL.,
PROPERTY TAXES AND TAX REVOLTS: THE LEGACY OF PROPOSITION 13, 97-109
(1995) (explaining the California tax revolt of the late 1970's and discussing the effects
of policies implemented thereafter).
189. Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1004 (explaining the temptation to "ensure the requi-
site tax increments by delineating project boundaries to encompass enormous areas,
hundreds of thousands of areas").
190. See Purver, supra note 1, § 3.
191. See infra notes 192-193 and accompanying text.
192. CLARENCE ARTHUR PERRY, THE REBUILDING OF BLIGHTED AREAS: A
STUDY OF THE NEIGHBORHOOD UNIT IN REPLANNING AND PLOT ASSEMBLAGE 9
(1933); see also FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 347-48 (defining "blighted areas" as
slums, or "areas in which land values after a period of increase are stationary or fall-
ing," areas in which buildings have become more or less obsolete, or areas character-
ized by building vacancies and the appearance of decay and dejection, where there is
no prospect of a renewed market for its original use or for other purposes).
193. PERRY, supra note 192, at 8; see also FOGELSON, supra note 10, at 349 (explain-
ing that the blighted districts discussed should've been razed because they were "in-
cipient slums" and explaining that slums "represent[ ] an advanced case of blight");
WOOD, supra note 89, at 3 ("It has long been known to students of housing that the
dwellings and neighborhoods in which a substantial fraction of the American people
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ing.194 The 1954 Housing Act expanded its blight definition to in-
clude the "conservation and rehabilitation of declining areas."' 95
Federal courts held that federal urban renewal law was intended
"to eliminate not only slums as narrowly defined ... but also the
blighted areas that tend to produce slums. ' 196 And local officials
proceeded on the assumption that projected blight was sufficient;
blight was "both a noun and a verb, both a condition and a
cause.
197
State redevelopment and TIF statutes, in turn, have used pro-
jected or future blight to justify a wide range of projects.198 This is
especially true in states that allow the designation of "conserva-
tion" areas.199 In Missouri, for example, an area can qualify for
redevelopment as a conservation district if fifty percent of the
structures contained by the district are more than thirty-five years
old-regardless of their condition.2 °° "Such an area is not yet a
blighted area," as the statute explains, "but is detrimental to public
health, safety, morals or welfare and may become a blighted
area."20 1 Even when such "conservation" provisions are not ex-
plicit in state law, courts have generally supported the idea that
redevelopment is as much a preventative measure as a corrective
measure, and that the definition of blight is "broad and encom-
passes not only those areas containing properties so dilapidated as
to justify condemnation as nuisances, but also envisions the pre-
vention of deterioration. 2 2
The idea of "future blight" gives developers and development
officials in most states the power to blight virtually any urban par-
cel.20 3 As with the "but for" test, projections of future growth or
decline are left largely to the judgment of those pushing for a given
live are of a character to injure the health, endanger the safety and morals and inter-
fere with the normal family life of their inhabitants.").
194. Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 994.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 993 n.6 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 24, 35 (1954)).
197. VOORHEES & Assoc., supra note 137; Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1008.
198. See infra notes 199-202 and accompanying text.
199. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 929 n.53.
200. Id.; see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.805(3) (1982) (amended 1986, 1991 and
1997); Reinert, supra note 16, at 1033-34.
201. Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.805 (3). For an interpretation and discussion of the stat-
ute, see Goshorn, supra note 3, at 929 n.53 and Reinert, supra note 16, at 1033-34.
202. Oberndorf v. Denver, 900 F.2d 1434, 1439 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Tracy v.
Boulder, 635 P.2d 907, 909 (Colo. Ct. App. 1981)); Purver, supra note 1, § 3.
203. Cf. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1131 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (noting that under the doctrine of future blight, "no rede-
velopment site can ever be truly free from blight").
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redevelopment project.2 ° This has meant that even the relative
prosperity of an area can be used as an argument for its redevelop-
ment-on the assumption that such prosperity cannot last. 05  In
the debate over the infamous "Nordstrom's TIF" in suburban St.
Louis, all agreed that the mall in question was the region's greatest
economic asset.20 6 For those pushing the TIF deal, however, this
prosperity was inherently fragile and projection of future competi-
tive losses to newer malls was enough to justify a designation of
blight.2 °7
California is one of the few states to reject the idea of future
blight, largely as a reaction to inventive abuses of its pre-1993 rede-
velopment laws.20 8 In the Lancaster case, developers twisted the
blight designation in two ways-by arguing that the original blight
designation still applied despite the fact that the area had been
completely redeveloped since that time, and by arguing that the
departure of one of the mall's tenants, which the redevelopment
proposal aimed to prevent, would create "future blight. '20 9 State
courts rejected both arguments, in part because the proposal was
such a bald abuse of eminent domain and in part because Califor-
nia law, before and after the 1993 reforms, hewed to a more restric-
tive and sensible view that "[d]eterminations of blight are to be
made on the basis of an area's existing use, not its potential use. 210
F. Who Gets the Taxes?
Finally, blighting and redevelopment, especially under TIF stat-
utes, is distorted by an intense local competition for tax reve-
204. Cf JG St. Louis W. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Des Peres, 41 S.W.3d 513, 518 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2001) (finding that a prosperous shopping mall could still be an economic liabil-
ity where blighting factors exist and the mall is not "keeping its value relative to
neighboring, similarly situated and similarly used properties").
205. Cf. id. (holding that while "there were reasonable theories supporting each




208. 99 Cents Only Stores v. Lancaster Redevelopment Agency, 237 F. Supp. 2d
1123, 1130, 1130 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
209. Id. at 1130-31.
210. Id. (citing Friends of Mammoth v. Town of Mammoth Lakes Redevelopment
Agency, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 334, 362 (Ct. App. 2000)); see also Sweetwater Valley Civic
Ass'n v. Nat'l City, 555 P.2d 1099, 1103-04 (Cal. 1976) (stating that "the legislature
made clear its intent that a determination of blight be made-not on the basis of
potential alternative use of the proposed area-but on the basis of the area's existing
use").
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nues.2 1 1  In this respect, the eradication of blight is clearly
secondary to the larger goal of padding the tax base, and any op-
portunity to do so invariably stretches the definition of blight to
any property not assessed at its fullest potential.212 As early as the
1930s, local development officials were defining blight as an eco-
nomic liability, an area in which "the taxes do not pay for public
service. ' 213 And the Model Charter adopted by the National Mu-
nicipal League in 1937 defined blight, in part, as the "stagnation of
development and damage and loss to community prosperity and
taxable values. ' 214 Such considerations were not common in the
run of state redevelopment laws passed in the 1940s, 215 but they re-
appeared in state TIF statutes or "economic development" desig-
nations adopted in the 1970s and 1980s.216 The Missouri TIF stat-
ute in 1982, for example, imported its definition of blight from that
state's 1945 redevelopment law, 2 17 but also declared that redevel-
opment was in the public interest because it would "result in the
preservation or enhancement of the tax base of the municipal-
ity."'218 In Iowa, the TIF statute in 1985 declared blight "an eco-
nomic and social liability imposing onerous municipal burdens
which decrease the tax base and reduce tax revenues.
21 9
At the same time, of course, winning increased property tax rev-
enues is a largely symbolic incentive because the public policy that
leverages higher assessments also takes much of that assessed value
211. See Joyce Y. Man, Effect of Tax Increment Financing on Economic Develop-
ment, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUC-
TURES AND IMPACT 101, 102 (Craig L. Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
212. See Chapman, supra note 54, at 115 (stating that "TIF redevelopment could be
a major revenue-producing instrument").
213. WALKER, supra note 41, at 4 (citing ARCHITECTS' CLUB OF CHI., REHABILI-
TATING BLIGHTED AREAS, REPORT OF COMMITrEE ON BLIGHTED AREA HOUSING 9
(1932)).
214. Id. at 5 (quoting NAT'L MUN. LEAGUE, MODEL CITY CHARTER (1937)).
215. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2) (2003) (defining a "[b]lighted prea" as
"that portion of the city within which the legislative authority of such city determines
that by reason of age, obsolescence, inadequate or outmoded design or physical dete-
rioration, have become economic and social liabilities, and that such conditions are
conducive to ill health, transmission of disease, crime or inability to pay reasonable
taxes"), with WALKER, supra note 41, at 3 (providing several official definitions of
"slum" from the 1930s, including "a residential area where the houses and conditions
of life are of a squalid and wretched character and which hence has become a social
liability to the community") (quoting PRESIDENT'S CONFERENCE, BLIGHTED AREAS
& SLUMS, supra note 43, at 1).
216. See Chapman, supra note 54, at 130 (noting "little use of tax increment financ-
ing techniques prior to the mid-1970's" in most states).
217. Mo. REV. STAT. § 353.020(2).
218. Mo. REV. STAT. § 99.805(5)(c) (1982) (amended 1986, 1991 and 1997).
219. IOWA CODE § 403.2(1) (1999).
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off the tax rolls for the life of the TIF (often over twenty years).220
But, while increased property tax revenues are often a distant
promise in TIF-based redevelopment, there are a number of ancil-
lary benefits or strategies embedded in local redevelopment polit-
ics. 221 TIFs allow local governments to devote new monies to
redevelopment without running up against municipal debt limits
enforced by state constitutions.222 Most states either exempt TIFs
from local debt limits or establish separate limits for them; 223 only
five states have held that TIFs are subject to local debt limits. 224
In turn, TIFs can force other beneficiaries of local property
taxes, including school districts, counties, sewer districts, and zoo
or museum districts, to subsidize (often reluctantly) municipal re-
development.225 In only a few states do these other taxing bodies
claim any substantive role or representation in the approval of new
TIFs.226 Although the municipality does not see any new revenues
in its general fund, it does see a greater share of local taxes devoted
to exclusively municipal projects.227 In California, for example,
TIFs have effectively doubled the property tax share claimed by
cities.22 8 The degree to which a redevelopment area is subsidized
by other local taxing jurisdictions depends on its success in stimu-
lating growth.229 But local studies have found that, allowing for
revenue adjustments such as "pass-throughs" and state aid, and
natural patterns of growth, TIFs fall far short of their promise as
220. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 74, at 43-44.
221. See id. at 52.
222. See id. at 45-47.
223. Id. (indicating that thirty-nine states exempt TIFs from local debt limits or
establish separate limits for them).
224. Id.; see also Goshorn, supra note 3, at 938-42 (discussing the debt limitations of
TIFs in Missouri).
225. Johnson & Kriz, supra note 74, at 49.
226. Most states, in response to both the regional inequities of the property tax
base and the effects of TIFs and abatements, provided direct state aid to schools.
Robert G. Lehnen & Carlyn E. Johnson, The Impact of Tax Increment Financing on
School Districts: An Indiana Case Study, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING AND Eco-
NOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES AND IMPACT 137, 137-42 (Craig L. John-
son & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001). But this too can encourage local governments to
TIF. In Coronado, California, local officials used an expansive local TIF to make
local schools eligible for state "backfill" aid-and then proceeded to dedicate local
TIF proceeds to the schools as well. Detwiler & Dale, supra note 13, at 11-12.
227. See Lehnen & Johnson, supra note 226, at 137-42.
228. DARDIA, supra note 136, at 4.
229. See NCBG, WHO PAYS, supra note 2, at 14 (requiring a municipality seeking
the benefit of tax increment financing to "show that using tax increment financing in
such an area would result in stabilization of the property tax base or that improve-
ments to the property in the district would result in an actual increase in valuation
when the property is returned to the tax base after the TIF district expires").
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self-financing growth machines.23 ° In California, redevelopment
agencies with new "but for" growth, generate only about half of
the tax increments they receive. 231 In Chicago, less than one-quar-
ter of projected TIF revenues ($ 1.6 billion for 2002-25) can be rea-
sonably attributed to growth stimulated by the TIFs themselves.232
This municipal tax grab has become especially desperate given
recent restrictions on property taxation.233 Proposition 13 and its
imitators have pressed local governments to create new assessed
value, or use property tax-based inducements, such as TIFs and
abatements, to pad the local sales tax base.234 In a recent Califor-
nia case, for example, city officials denied a conditional use permit
to a prospective church and moved to claim the land for retail re-
development, on the explicit grounds that the latter would yield
greater tax revenues than a (tax-exempt) church.235 A District
Court granted the church a temporary injunction, and pointedly
punctured the city's blight designation-noting that the construc-
tion of either a church or a retail outlet would "eliminate the
blight" claimed by city officials and that "[r]evenue generation is
not the type of activity that is needed to 'protect public health or
safety.' ,,236 Even in affluent residential suburbs, caps on property
taxation have encouraged local officials to retreat from long-stand-
ing patterns of exclusionary zoning, such as limiting commercial
development, small residential lots and multi-family housing, to
compete for new retail development. 237 This practice is especially
prevalent in states, such as Missouri, in which sales taxes are a rela-
tively important source of local revenue, and local governments
can lay claim to local increase, or increment, in sales taxes as
well.238 In suburban St. Louis, for example, there are substantial
230. See id. at 14-15, 19-22.
231. Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 998.
232. NCBG, WHO PAYS, supra note 2, at 21.
233. See Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 998-1006.
234. See, e.g., FRIEDEN & SAGALYN, supra note 59, at 144-47 (discussing the tax-
limiting nature of Proposition 13).
235. Cottonwood Christian Ctr. v. Cypress Redevelopment Agency, 218 F. Supp.
2d 1203, 1213 (C.D. Cal. 2002). My thanks to Greg LeRoy for calling this case to my
attention.
236. Id. at 1228 (quoting First Covenant Church of Seattle v. Seattle, 840 P.2d 174,
185 (Wash. 1992)).
237. See DARDIA, supra note 136, at 12, 24; Lefcoe, supra note 14, at 1011-18, 1029-
31.
238. See John L. Mikesell, Nonproperty Tax Increment Programs for Economic De-
velopment: A Review of the Alternative Programs, in TAX INCREMENT FINANCING
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: USES, STRUCTURES AND IMPACT 57, 64 (Craig L.
Johnson & Joyce Y. Man eds., 2001).
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incentives to buy out middle-income housing and replace it with
retail development-in effect trading properties that return low
revenues and high demands to the local tax base with those promis-
ing high revenues and low demands. 239 This is true in both "point
of origin" cities that get to keep local sales taxes and in other cities
that can effectively use TIFs to become "point of origin" cities for
the lives of the TIFs.240
III. "BLIGHT" AND TIF REFORM
Well-documented and often outrageous abuses of state redevel-
opment laws have pressed a number of states and interested parties
to consider reform.24' Some, recognizing the patent insincerity of
both blight definitions and "but for" tests, have suggested severing
TIF policy entirely from its roots in urban renewal and recasting it
solely around economic development.242 More commonly, reform-
ers have sought to restrain and regulate TIFs in such a way as to tie
their use more closely to the general welfare of the community.243
Such reforms have included:
Renewed attention to the provision of affordable housing, in-
cluding, as in the 1999 reforms passed in Illinois,244 rigorous
housing impact studies, relocation assistance for displaced per-
sons and an allowance for construction costs for affordable
housing units;245
239. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 920-23.
240. See id. at 919-20; End the Tax Giveaway, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Nov. 25,
1989, at 2B; A Shell Game with Tax Money, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 6, 1989,
at 2C.
241. See infra notes 242-251 and accompanying text.
242. See, e.g., Reinert, supra note 16, at 1051-52 (suggesting that legislative reform
of TIF will lead to a better use of municipal funds and public satisfaction).
243. See NEIGHBORHOOD CAPITAL BUDGET GROUP, NCBG's TIF HANDBOOK 16-
19 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter NCBG, TIF HANDBOOK], available at http://www.ncbg.
org/documentsfTlFhandbooksecondedition.pdf; McFarlane, supra note 68, at 930-31
(arguing that the community must be included in the decision-making process to
broaden the definition of economic development to include the needs of the
community).
244. ILLINOIS TAX INCREMENT Ass'N, 1999 TAX INCREMENT REFORMS INCLUDED
IN SB 1032 6-7 [hereinafter ILL. TAX INCREMENT Ass'N, 1999 TAX INCREMENT RE-
FORMS], available at http://www.illinois-tif.com/TIFreform.htm (last modified Oct. 21,
2003).
245. See id.; NCBG, TIF HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 16-19; STATEWIDE HOUS.
ACTION COALITION (Chicago), TAX INCREMENT FINANCING REFORM 64-65 (n.d.)
[hereinafter SHAC, FINANCING REFORM]. The old law had prohibited any "bricks
and mortar" use of TIF funds. Neighborhood Capital Budget Group, Tax Increment
Financing, at http://www.ncbg.org/tifs/tifs.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2004) (noting that
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Greater transparency and accountability, including impact stud-
ies, public notice, early and formal public hearings, formalized
neighborhood representation, joint review boards representing
all affected taxing jurisdictions and annual reports;246
New rules requiring the distribution of funds, including
mandatory compensation or reimbursement of affected school
districts (following the California lead), 47 tighter restraints on
TIF spending for many uses, such as retail development, munici-
pal buildings and golf courses,248 and looser rules regarding TIF
spending on affordable housing, child care and job-training;2 49
and
Various inducements to "high road" economic development, in-
cluding more careful "scoring" of proposed developments, such
as assessment of job creation and retention, job quality and en-
vironmental impacts,250 and protections against relocation or
piracy.2 51
Overlapping all of these proposals, and integral to their success,
is a substantial statutory redefinition of "blight. ' 252 Such a redefi-
nition would, ideally, address all of the abuses touched on above; it
under the current law TIF funds "cannot be used for the 'bricks and mortar' costs of
construction [ ]except for affordable housing").
246. NCBG, TIF HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 17-20; CTR. ON WIS. STRATEGY,
PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF TIF REFORM 4-5 (2000) [hereinafter COWS, PROPOSED EL-
EMENTS OF TIF REFORM], available at http://www.cows.org/pdf/econdev/tif/rp-tif.pdf.
247. See Chapman, supra note 54, at 130 (noting that California schools receive a
share of the increased tax revenue via a mandated formula).
248. NCBG, TIF HANDBOOK, supra note 243, at 19.
249. SHAC, FINANCING REFORM, supra note 245, at 64-65;' see also COWS, PRO-
POSED ELEMENTS OF TIF REFORM, supra note 246, at 3 (recommending that job crea-
tion and retention and child care be considered during the assessment of new TIF
proposals).
250. Cows, PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF TIF REFORM, supra note 246, at 1-4 (explain-
ing that "high road" economic development "refer[s] to strategies that are associated
with high productivity, high pay, reduced environmental damage, and greater commit-
ment to the health and stability of surrounding communities" and advocating
"[s]tronger mandatory scoring criteria [ ]for TIF applications" in order to consider
whether proposed TIFs will foster "[j]ob [c]reation, [r]etention and [q]uality" as well
as '[e]nvironmental [q]uality").
251. Reforms in Missouri, for example, would prohibit TIF-financing of both man-
ufacturing relocation and "unfair competition" with existing businesses. See H.B.
1496, 91st Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 2002) (unenacted), available at http://www.
house.state.mo.us/bills02/biltxtO2/perfO2/HB1496.htm; Bill Bell, Jr., Rep. Stokan
Targets Subsidy for Rich Areas; She Cites Tax-Increment Financing of Mall Here; Plan
Faces Opposition, ST. Louis POsT-DISPATCH, Apr. 20, 1998, at B2; Blight Made Right,
ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 25, 2002, at B6; Terry Ganey, Missouri House OKs
Legislation to Restrict Use of TIF Tax Breaks; Bill Seeks to Limit Law's Use to Areas
of Real Economic Decline, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Mar. 22, 2002, at B3; see also
COWS, PROPOSED ELEMENTS OF TIF REFORM, supra note 246, at 4.
252. See infra notes 253-260 and accompanying text.
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would restrict blighting to urban and residential areas, adopt
clearer objective standards for both the determination of blight and
the "but for" test, control the reach and scale of TIF or redevelop-
ment areas and ensure that the eradication of blight, and not a
short-sighted scramble to pad the local tax base, remains the or-
ganizing principle of redevelopment. Examples of such reforms,
albeit less than ideal, can be found in three settings: the California
reform of 1993,253 the Illinois reform of 1999,254 and the pending
reform in Missouri.255 To date, such reforms of the blight defini-
tion have included a rewording of the descriptive criteria in order
to avoid the "double-counting" of similar factors;256 the addition of
new descriptive criteria;257 a "check list" formula, as used in Illi-
nois2 58 and California,259 and a tighter definition of eligible proper-
253. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33031 (Deering 2003); see also DARDIA,
supra note 136, at 6, 28; Chapman, supra note 54, at 129.
254. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4 (West 2003); see also ILL. TAX INCREMENT
Ass'N, 1999 TAX INCREMENT REFORMS, supra note 244, at 5-8; NCBG, TIF HAND-
BOOK, supra note 243, at 16-20; SHAC, FINANCING REFORM, supra note 245, at 64-
65; TALANKER ET AL., supra note 119, at 12-13.
255. Blight Made Right, supra note 251, at B6; Ganey, supra note 251, at B3. The
2002 version of this bill was passed by the Missouri House but died with the end of the
2002 session. H.B. 1496, 91st Gen. Assem., 2nd Sess. (Mo. 2002) (unenacted), availa-
ble at http://www.house.state.mo.us/bills02/bills02/HB1496.htm. Essentially the same
bill has been reintroduced in 2003. S.B. 172, 92d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess. (Mo. 2003)
(unenacted), available at http://www.senate.state.mo.us/03INFO/billtext/SB172.htm.
256. In Illinois, for example, some older criteria, such as "age" and "depreciation of
physical maintenance," were removed and others, such as "excessive land coverage"
and "overcrowding," were collapsed to avoid the "double-counting" of similar factors.
65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a) (West 2003) (amending 65 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/11-74.4-3(a) (1999)).
257. In Missouri, the draft bill includes new "blight" indicators based on local un-
employment or fiscal capacity. S.B. 172, 92d Gen. Assem., 1st Sess., §§ 99.805(7), (8)
(Mo. 2003) (unenacted), available at http://www.senate.state.mo.us/03INFO/billtext/
SB172.htm. In Illinois, "environmental clean-up" and declining tax assessments were
added as leading indicators of blight. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1)(K),
(M).
258. In Illinois, "a combination of [five] or more of the following factors" must be
present in order for a blight designation to be appropriate: dilapidation; obsolescence;
deterioration; code violations; illegal use; excessive vacancies; lack of ventilation, light
or sanitary facilities; inadequate utilities; excessive land coverage and overcrowding;
deleterious land use; environmental clean-up; lack of planning; and declining assessed
values. 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-3(a)(1).
259. In California, blighted areas must feature at least one of four "physical" condi-
tions, and at least one of five "economic" conditions. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 33031 (West 1999). The "physical conditions that cause blight" are listed as:
[b]uildings in which it is unsafe or unhealthy for persons to live or work....
caused by serious building code violations, dilapidation and deterioration,
defective design or physical construction, faulty or inadequate utilities, or
other similar factors[; (2) f]actors that prevent or substantially hinder the
economically viable use or capacity of buildings or lots. . . .caused by a
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ties, checking abuses by restricting land eligible for designation as a
blighted area.260
There remain, however, a number of problems.2 61 As the Cali-
fornia experience attests, more carefully descriptive criteria, and
requirements that blighted areas satisfy a certain "check list" of
such criteria, do not change the fact that judgments as to things like
"obsolescence", "dilapidation", or "deleterious land uses" remain
highly subjective. 62 Moreover, blight remains a designation sought
by developers, and hence shaped not by public purpose, but by pri-
vate interests seeking public subsidies.263 Finally, state level re-
forms remain spooked by the prospect of interstate
substandard design, inadequate size given present standards and market
conditions, lack of parking, or other similar factors[; (3) a]djacent or nearby
uses that are incompatible with each other and which prevent the economic
development of those parcels or other portions of the project area[; and (4)
t]he existence of subdivided lots of irregular form and shape and inadequate
size for proper usefulness and development that are in multiple ownership.
Id. § 33031(a). The "economic conditions that cause blight" are listed as:
[d]epreciated or stagnant property values or impaired investments, includ-
ing, but not necessarily limited to, those properties containing hazardous
wastes that require the use of agency authority [as statutorily specified; (2)
a]bnormally high business vacancies, abnormally low lease rates, high turno-
ver rates, abandoned buildings, or excessive vacant lots within an area devel-
oped for urban use and served by utilities[; (3) a] lack of necessary
commercial facilities that are normally found in neighborhoods, including
grocery stores, drug stores, and banks and other lending institutions[; (4)
r]esidential overcrowding or an excess of bars, liquor stores, or other busi-
nesses that cater exclusively to adults, that has led to problems of public
safety and welfare[; (5) a] high crime rate that constitutes a serious threat to
the public safety and welfare.
Id. § 33031(b).
260. Most state reforms have moved to check abuses by sharply restricting the defi-
nition of blight with respect to wetlands, vacant land and agricultural land. See
TALANKER ET AL., STRAYING FROM GOOD INTENTIONS, supra note 119, at 7-23; see
also COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-107(1) (2000) (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 31-25-
107(1) (1998)) (encapsulating a 1999 Colorado reform requiring the boundaries of a
blighted area to be drawn as narrowly as possible).
261. Infra notes 262-267 and accompanying text.
262. E.g., 65 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-74.4-2(1) (West 2003) (defining "dilapida-
tion" as "[a]n advanced state of disrepair or neglect of necessary repairs to the pri-
mary structural components of buildings or improvements in such a combination that
a documented building condition analysis determines that major repair is required or
the defects are so serious and so extensive that the buildings must be removed"; "ob-
solescence" as "[t]he condition or process of falling into disuse [whereby . . .
s]tructures have become ill-suited for the original use"; and "deleterious land uses" as
"[t]he existence of incompatible land-use relationships, buildings occupied by inap-
propriate or mixed-uses, or uses considered noxious, offensive, or unsuitable for the
surrounding area").
263. See Goshorn, supra note 3, at 919-24; Blight Made Right, supra note 251, at B6.
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disadvantage. 64 The Missouri TIF reform, for example, was
crafted largely by St. Louis area legislators interested in curtailing
cutthroat competition for retail investment in that city's suburbs;265
but because Kansas City faces suburban competition across a state
line, the pending reform applies only to St. Louis and its suburbs
and is not intended to be effective state wide.266 Thus, problems
revolve around both the law and its administration.267 Meaningful
reform must address both the imprecision and ambiguities of ex-
isting blight definitions and the incentives to twist those definitions
created by fragmented federal and metropolitan governance.
264. See, e.g., Bell, Rep. Stokan Targets Subsidy, supra note 251, at B2 (quoting a
statement by a Missouri legislator expressing fear that amendments to the state's TIF
program would ruin projects in Missouri and encourage development to move to
Kansas and Illinois).
265. Id.
266. See Blight Made Right, supra note 251, at B6.
267. See supra notes 63-88 and accompanying text.
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